Recent Developments: Robinson v. Baltimore Police Dep\u27t: Knowingly Making a False Statement Material to and during an Investigation of Prior Misconduct Has a One Year Statute of Limitations and, Therefore, Charges against an Officer Must Be Filed within One Year of the False Statement Coming to the Attention of the Appropriate Agency by Joffe, Benjamin
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 42
Number 2 Spring 2012 Article 11
2012
Recent Developments: Robinson v. Baltimore
Police Dep't: Knowingly Making a False Statement
Material to and during an Investigation of Prior
Misconduct Has a One Year Statute of Limitations
and, Therefore, Charges against an Officer Must Be
Filed within One Year of the False Statement
Coming to the Attention of the Appropriate
Agency
Benjamin Joffe
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joffe, Benjamin (2012) "Recent Developments: Robinson v. Baltimore Police Dep't: Knowingly Making a False Statement Material to
and during an Investigation of Prior Misconduct Has a One Year Statute of Limitations and, Therefore, Charges against an Officer
Must Be Filed within One Year of the False Statement Coming to the Attention of the Appropriate Agency," University of Baltimore Law
Forum: Vol. 42 : No. 2 , Article 11.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol42/iss2/11
RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
ROBINSON V. BALTIMORE POLICE DEP'T 
By: Benjamin Joffe 
KNOWINGLY MAKING A FALSE STATEMENT MATERIAL 
TO AND DURING AN INVESTIGATION OF PRIOR 
MISCONDUCT HAS A ONE YEAR STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS AND, THEREFORE, CHARGES AGAINST AN 
OFFICER MUST BE FILED WITHIN ONE YEAR OF THE 
FALSE STATEMENT COMING TO THE ATTENTION OF 
THE APPROPRIATE AGENCY. 
All Recent Developments are available on the University of Baltimore 
Law Forum website: http://law.ubalt.edullawforum. 
Please cite this Recent Development as Robinson v. Baltimore Police 
Dep't, 42 U. BaIt. L.F. 243 (2012). 
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     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that when calculating the 
statute of limitations for knowingly making a false statement material 
to an investigation of prior misconduct, the period begins to run on the 
date the agency becomes aware that the officer made the false 
statement.  Robinson v. Baltimore Police Dep’t, 424 Md. 41, 33 A.3d 
972 (2011).  The court rejected the argument that the period begins to 
run on the date of the incident giving rise to the investigation, and as a 
result, the appropriate law enforcement agency has one year from the 
date it learns of the false statement to bring administrative charges.  Id. 
at 41, 33 A.3d at 972.  
     On February 22, 2007, a Baltimore Police Department (“BPD”) 
officer arrested Teressa Houssain (“Houssain”) and charged her with 
prostitution.  During her arrest, Houssain told a member of the BPD 
that she recently engaged in sexual intercourse with another member 
of the BPD, Sergeant Steve Robinson (“Robinson”).  Three days prior 
to her arrest, Houssain claimed that she approached a silver SUV and a 
man introduced himself as “Steve.”  This man then showed her a 
Baltimore City Police Identification Card with the name Robinson 
printed on it and propositioned her for sex.  Houssain accepted 
Robinson’s proposition, and the two engaged in sexual intercourse in 
the back of his vehicle in the lot of an empty Park and Ride.  This 
incident was referred to the Internal Investigation Division (“IID”) of 
the BPD, which served Robinson with a Notification of Complaint for 
engaging in sexual misconduct while on duty on February 19, 2007.   
     IID investigators interviewed Robinson on July 11, 2007, and again 
on August 1, 2007.  During both interviews, Robinson denied knowing 
Houssain and denied having sexual intercourse with her.  Robinson 
claimed that on the date in question he was not driving the vehicle 
identified by Houssain, and he provided “EZ Pass” receipts for his 
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personal sedan on that date.  In addition, Robinson informed IID 
investigators that his supervisor instructed him to use his personal 
vehicle while participating in prostitution sting operations.  Robinson 
also alleged that he was unfamiliar with the Park and Ride and he was 
not there on the day of the alleged incident.  IID investigators retrieved 
video footage from security cameras located within the Park and Ride 
lot and discovered that Robinson and Houssain were in a silver SUV 
on February 19, 2007.  Robinson’s EZ Pass receipts were found to be 
fraudulent and Robinson’s supervisor informed IID investigators that 
he never told Robinson to use his own vehicle. 
     On June 26, 2008, the BPD charged Robinson with six 
administrative violations of the BPD General Orders.  A BPD 
charging committee, with the recommendation of IID investigators, 
terminated Robinson’s employment on July 11, 2008.  Robinson filed 
a Complaint in conjunction with a Petition to Show Cause in the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City, alleging that the one-year statute of 
limitations period barred all six violations.  The Circuit Court for 
Baltimore City granted the BPD’s motion for summary judgment on 
the false statement charge.  Robinson appealed to the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland, which affirmed the circuit court’s judgment in 
an unreported opinion.  Robinson then filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari, which the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted.   
     Robinson argued that the one-year statute of limitations period for 
bringing charges related to the false statements had expired on 
February 22, 2008, which was one year after Houssain’s arrest on 
February 22, 2007, when the BPD learned of his misconduct.  
Robinson, 424 Md. at 47-48, 33 A.3d at 976-78.  In support of his 
argument, Robinson cited section 3-106 of the Law Enforcement 
Officers’ Bill of Rights (“LEOBR”) requiring that all charges be 
brought against an officer within one year after the act that gave rise to 
the charges came to the attention of the agency.  Id. at 47-48, 33 A.3d 
at 976-77.   
     Alternatively, the BPD claimed the acts that gave rise to the cause 
of action occurred on the dates that Robinson uttered the false 
statements during his interviews, which were on July 11 and August 1, 
2007.  Robinson, 424 Md. at 50, 33 A.3d at 978.  The BPD argued that 
prior to those dates no false statements had been made, and there could 
be no false statement charge prior to the IID interviews.  Id.  Applying 
this time frame, the one-year limitations period would not expire until 
July 11, 2008, which was after the June 26, 2008 charging date.  Id.   
     In its analysis, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the one-
year limitations period proffered by the BPD was correct, and affirmed 
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the judgment of the intermediate appellate court.  Robinson, 424 Md. 
at 51, 33 A.3d at 978-79.  In reaching its decision the court relied on 
the basic rules of statutory construction.  Id.  The court proceeded to 
ascertain the legislative intent by examining the plain language of the 
statute at issue.  Id. (citing State v. Johnson, 415 Md. 413, 421, 2 A.3d 
368, 373 (2010)).  The court concluded that the plain meaning of 
section 3-106 of the LEOBR was unambiguous and did not support 
Robinson’s argument.  Robinson, 424 Md. at 52, 33 A.3d at 979.  If 
the statute of limitations period was to begin on February 22, 2007, as 
argued by Robinson, the text of section 3-106 would have to plainly 
state the period as such.  Id. at 50-51, 33 A.3d at 978.  The court noted 
that Robinson failed to provide any support through legislation or case 
law that would indicate a reading of section 3-106 in the manner he 
requested.  Id. at 51, 33 A.3d at 979.  The court stated that language 
would have to be added to the text of section 3-106 to create a timeline 
similar to what Robinson argued.  Id.    
     The court further stated that Robinson’s interpretation of section 3-
106 would lead to illogical results and offered a hypothetical scenario 
in support of their conclusion.  Robinson, 424 Md. at 51-52, 33 A.3d 
at 979.  The scenario began with an officer making false statements 
during an investigation into an incident that occurred eleven months 
and twenty-eight days prior to the making of the false statements.  Id.  
IID investigators would be required to either bring charges for the 
false statements during the three following days or the action would be 
time barred.  Id. at 52, 33 A.3d at 979.  The court described this 
hypothetical situation as an absurdity, and the plain meaning of section 
3-106 of the LEOBR could not be read to support this argument.  Id. at 
51-52, 33 A.3d at 979.   
     The court reached its final determination after reviewing section 3-
113(a) of the LEOBR.  Robinson, 424 Md. at 52, 33 A.3d at 979.  This 
section expressly prohibits BPD officers from knowingly making a 
false statement material to an investigation.  Id.  The court determined 
that the Maryland General Assembly would not intend to create an 
additional statute if the making of a false statement could be charged 
under section 3-106.  Id. at 52-53, 33 A.3d at 979.  Accordingly, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the statute of limitations 
period within section 3-106 began on the date of the first false 
statement, which in this case was July 11, 2007.  Id. at 53, 33 A.3d at 
980.  The BPD, therefore, filed the charges against Robinson for 
knowingly making a false statement within the applicable period of 
limitations.  Id.  
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     In Robinson, the Court of Appeals of Maryland demonstrated its 
commitment to strict principles of statutory construction by examining 
the legislative intent of the Maryland General Assembly to determine 
an appropriate statute of limitations period.  The act of knowingly 
making a false statement material to an investigation constitutes a 
separate cause of action that cannot be attributed to an earlier act of 
misconduct even though that conduct was under investigation when 
the false statement was made.  The court’s holding in Robinson serves 
as a strong deterrent for similar officer misconduct, as BPD 
investigators now have additional options to sanction untruthful 
investigative behavior under the text of section 3-113(a). 
 
